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Abstract
We study the optimization of the stable marriage problem. All individuals
attempt to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting
constraints. We find that the stable solutions are generally not the globally
best solution, but reasonably close to it. All the stable solutions form a
special sub-set of the meta-stable states, obeying interesting scaling laws.
Both numerical and analytical tools are used to derive our results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Optimization problems have become an interesting area of research in statistical physics.
They usually require to find the minimum (or minima) of a global quantity (e.g. Hamilto-
nian). Spin-glasses are just one of the current well-known examples. In the context of social
science or economy, decision-makers are individuals or companies. They have their own
rather selfish goals to optimize, which are often conflicting. This situation, which is typical
in game theory, cannot be described by a global Hamiltonian [1,2]. One of its simplest
realizations is in the classical stable marriage problem [3–5]. Despite its simple definition
the solutions have a very rich structure.
The stable marriage optimization problem does not require the ”energy” to be the small-
est possible, but that the resulting state be stable against the egoistic attempts of individuals
to lower their own “energy”. This new concept of equilibrium is typical in game theory where
one deals with a number N of distinct agents, each of whom is trying to maximize his utility
at the same time. It is not true in general that the state with the largest total utility will
be an equilibrium state. Indeed it is possible that in such a state an agent would benefit
from making an action which increases his utility at the expense of others. This leads to the
concept of Nash equilibrium [6], which is a state characterized by the stability with respect
to the action of any agent. In other words, a state is stable if any change in an agent’s
strategy is unfavorable for himself.
The marriage problem describes a system where two sets ofN persons have to be matched
pairwise. We shall assume that these sets are composed of men and women who are to be
married. Clearly the marriage problem is applicable in many different contexts where two
distinct sets have to be matched with the best satisfaction. For instance, one can consider
N applicants facing N ′ jobs. Each applicant has a preference list of jobs and each job-
owner ranks the applicants in order of preference. For the convenience of presentation we
exclusively use the paradigm of marriage between men and women. Suppose the men and the
women in the two sets know each other well. Based on his knowledge each man establishes
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a wish-list of his desired women, in the descending priority order, i.e. on the top of his list
is his dream girl; the bottom is a mate whom he has to marry only in the worst case when
all the other women reject him. The women do exactly the same to the men. Note that in
the convention of this model, everybody must marry.
In our model, we make the further simplifying assumption that each person’s satisfaction
depends on the rank of the partner he/she gets to marry. Thus the rank can be seen as
a cost function. If the top choice is attained, the cost is the least, the bottom choice has
the highest cost. Two men may happen to put the same woman as their top choice, or two
women may happen to prefer the same man. There are necessarily conflicting wishes which
give a special complexity to the problem. We shall deal here with the case in which each
person’s wish-list is randomly and independently established.
II. THE MODEL
In order to set up the notation let us look at the following example of three men and
three women. The preference lists for all persons are shown below.
1: 1 2 3 1: 3 1 2
2: 1 3 2 2: 1 2 3
3: 2 3 1 3: 3 2 1
Men’s preference lists Women’s preference lists
The detailed cost for each person can be set observing that, e.g. if man 1 marries woman
2 his cost is 2 since she is in the second position of his preference list and, vice versa, the
cost for woman 2 is 1. If man 2 marries woman 1, his cost is 1 and if man 3 marries woman
3 his cost is 2. The costs of women 1 and 3 in these cases are 3 and 1, respectively.
It is convenient to introduce a representation of the lists in terms of rankings: We define
the matrices F and H for women and men respectively, such that f(w,m) denotes the
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position of a man m in the list of a woman w. Equivalently h(m,w) yields the rank of a
woman w in m’s list. Rank plays here a similar role to energy in statistical mechanics, so
we shall frequently refer to f(w,m) or h(m,w) as energies. A realization of the preference
lists is also called an instance. A matching is a set of N pairsM = {(mi, wi), i = 1, . . . , N},
and there are N ! possible matchings in an instance of size N .
The problem is to find a stable matching M = {(mi, wi)} such that one cannot find
a man mi and a woman wj who are not married (i 6= j) but would both prefer to marry
each other rather than staying with their respective partners wi and mj . Such a couple is
called a blocking pair. A blocking pair (mi, wj) is then such that f(wj, mi) < f(wj, mj) and
h(mi, wj) < h(mi, wi). If no such pair exists, the matching is called stable.
One can calculate the energy per person, for women and men in a given matching as
ǫF (M) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
f(wi, mi), ǫH(M) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
h(mi, wi)
and the energy ǫ(M) = ǫF (M)+ǫH(M) per couple. Here and in the following the subscripts
F and H stand for women and men, respectively.
III. THE GALE-SHAPLEY ALGORITHM
A lot of work has been spent in developing fast computer algorithms to find all stable
matchings for a given instance of size N [4,5]. These algorithms are based on the classical
Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm [3] which assigns the role of proposers to the elements of one
set, the men say, and of judgers to the elements of the other.
The man-oriented GS algorithm starts from a man m making a proposal to the first
woman w on his list. If she accepts they get married, if she refuses m goes on proposing to
the next woman on his list. w accepts a proposal when either she is not engaged or she is
engaged with a man m′ worse than the one proposing (m). In the latter case, m′ will have
to go on proposing to the woman following w on his list. When all men have run through
their lists proposing until all women are married, the algorithm stops and the matching thus
reached is a stable matching.
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As an illustration let us consider the example of the preceding paragraph. The man-
oriented GS algorithm goes as follows: man 1 proposes to woman 1 who accepts and they
form the pair (1, 1). Then 2 proposes to 1, but she refuses. So man 2 proposes to woman 3
and they get married. Finally man 3 happily marries woman 2. This results in the matching
MH = {(1, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2)}.
The GS algorithm can be run reversing the roles (woman-oriented) to yield the woman-
optimal stable matching. In our example, this leads to MF = {(1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3)}.
The energies for men and women in these matchings are (ǫH , ǫF ) = (4/3, 7/3) and
(6/3, 5/3) respectively for MH and MF . As seen in this example who proposes is always
better off than who judges.
It can be shown [4] that the man-oriented GS algorithm yields the man-optimal stable
matching in the sense that no man can have a better partner in any other stable matching.
It is rather surprising that though men get rejections nearly all the time and just one positive
answer, they are far better off than women. On the other hand women who take the pleasure
by saying no to almost all the suitors except one who is best among her suitors, will end up
in a marriage that is the worst among all possible stable ones. The lesson is that the person
who takes initiative is rewarded.
In order to quantify more precisely this statement, it is enough to observe that i) once
a woman is first engaged, she will remain engaged (eventually with different men) forever,
and that ii) the total energy for men in the man-optimal GS equals the total number of
proposals men need to make to marry all women. Proposals by men define an intrinsic
time in the algorithm. Imagine that at time tk (i.e. after tk proposals) the k
th woman gets
engaged. In view of the randomness of the preference lists, the probability that the next
proposal is addressed to one of the N −k free women is 1−k/N . On average, men will need
N/k = 〈tk+1 − tk〉 proposals to engage one more woman. Since the total energy for men is
NǫH = tN , we find
ǫH(MH) =
N∑
k=1
1
k
≈ logN + C (1)
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where C = 0.5772 . . . is Euler’s constant. Taking into account that men do not propose
twice to the same woman yields a correction of O((logN)2/N) to eq. (1). On the average
each woman receives logN + C proposals of men who are randomly distributed between 1
and N on her preference list. Keeping only the best proposal the women arrive at an energy
of the order of ǫF (MH) ≃ N/ logN which is much larger than the corresponding result (1)
for the men.
IV. STABLE MATCHINGS IN THE LARGE N LIMIT
Coming back to our N = 3 example, it is also interesting to note that none of the two
stable states we found is the one with the smallest energy, the “ground state”. Indeed the
stateM0 = {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 3)} has (ǫH , ǫF ) = (5/3, 5/3), and a total energy ǫ(M0) = 10/3
which is lower than those of the other two states. This state is however unstable. Indeed
there is one blocking pair (1, 1).
This simple example already shows some interesting features of the stable marriage prob-
lem: 1) minimum energy i.e. maximum global satisfaction does not imply stability (and vice
versa) and 2) there can be more than one stable matching (the GS algorithm guarantees
that there is always at least one stable matching).
In order to decrease the total energy of a given stable matching, it would be necessary
that some individuals pay the price of accepting a worse partner than the one with whom
they are actually married. But in absence of a supervising body (like government or parents)
they do not consider to help others by switching. The inherent selfishness and conflicting
optimizations in the stable marriage problem lead to stable solutions that are not globally
optimal.
It is known that the average number of stable states in an instance of size N is propor-
tional to N logN [5]. Starting from the man-optimal Gale-Shapley solution all other stable
matchings can be obtained by performing cyclic exchange processes
(µ1, ω1), . . . , (µr, ωr)→ (µ1, ω2), . . . , (µr, ω1) (2)
within a properly chosen group of pairs of men µi and women ωi. These exchange processes
are called rotations. The number r of pairs involved in a rotation can be regarded as the
”distance” between the two stable matchings connected by this rotation. Efficient algorithms
exist for finding all rotations and therefore all stable matchings in a given instance [5]. In
this way it has been found that stable states are organized in very peculiar graph-theoretical
structures [5].
We shall first analyze the statistics of stable states and then return to the concept of
rotations.
It is possible to derive a general relation between the energies of men and women in the
stable states. Our aim is to evaluate the energy of men, given that of women in a stable state.
We can then assume that a stable matching, in which woman w have energy ǫw, exists. In
order to find the stable matching we consider the “hypothetical” situation in which, for some
reason, the women know that they can reach a stable matching where woman w has energy
ǫw. Knowing this, the best strategy of women, becomes that of refusing all propositions
from men ranking higher than ǫw. The best strategy for men, on the other hand, remains
that of the GS algorithm. The dynamics of this modified GS algorithm will clearly reach
the stable state foreseen by women: Each man m makes his proposals sequentially until he
hits a woman w such that f(w,m) ≤ ǫw. In order to compute the average man energy,
consider a man m and, in order to simplify the notations, let his wish list be h(m,w) = w,
for w = 1, . . . , N1 His proposal to the wth woman, will fall randomly within 1 and N in
the rankings of woman w and, according to the above strategy, it will be accepted with a
probability ǫw/N . Otherwise, if it is refused, man m will consider the w + 1
st woman. The
probability that this man will get his qth choice is then
PH(q) =
q−1∏
w=1
(
1− ǫw
N
)
ǫq
N
. (3)
1This can always be achieved with a permutation of women indices. Clearly h(m′, w) 6= w for
m′ 6= m, in general.
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We can now take the average on realizations of the above equation. Under the assumption
that ǫw are independent random variables with average ǫF , we find
PH(q) =
(
1− ǫF
N
)q−1 ǫF
N
. (4)
From this we can compute the average energy for the mth man ǫH =
∑
qPH(q). This leads
to the relation
ǫH ǫF = N. (5)
In other words, in stable matchings, for random instances of the marriage problem, the
energies for men and women are inversely proportional.
Of course, reversing the roles of men and women, one finds the same conclusion eq. (5)
and a distribution PF (q) ≃ exp(−q/ǫH)/ǫH of women energies which depends on ǫH .
It is now possible, returning to the assumption of independence of the ǫw’s, to show that
only a weak correlation exists so that equations (4) and (5) are exact in the limit N →∞.
In order to do this we can run the above argument in its women-oriented version (with
women proposing) to derive the joint probability distribution of the energies of two women.
With independent men energies, it is clear that unless two women propose to the same man,
there will be no correlation between their energies. The probability that both propose to
the same man is of the order of ǫ2F/N
2, which implies a weak correlation of the form
〈δǫjδǫi〉 = c
N
〈ǫi〉2 (6)
among energies. This clearly holds both for women and for men under the assumption of
the independence of men or women energies, respectively. It can be easily seen that women
(men) energies are also weakly correlated, as in eq. (6), if men (women) energies are weakly
correlated. We therefore conclude self-consistently that energies are weakly correlated in
stable matchings.
In presence of a weak correlation of the form (6), the same procedure, from eq. (3) to eq.
(5) leads to ǫHǫF = N(1+4c/N). Therefore eq. (5) is exact in the limit N →∞. We found
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numerically that the constant c is generally negative (c ≃ −0.3 in man optimal states). This
correlation is similar to the one occurring among N variables whose sum is constrained.
Our numerical results indicate that the relation (5) is already satisfied approximatively
for a rather small number of pairs. Fig. 1 shows log ǫH as a function of log ǫF for all
stable matchings found in systems of size N = 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000. The asymptotic result
log ǫH + log ǫF = logN is indicated by lines. The points on the left and on the right of each
set of data correspond to the man and the woman optimal GS solutions, respectively.
Fig. 2 shows that the distribution of individual energies in a stable matching agrees very
well with the predicted exponential behavior eq. (4).
Although, as shown by the GS algorithm, stable matchings can be very asymmetric
regarding the energy of men and women, there is nevertheless a minimum energy of order
O(logN) that cannot be reduced further without losing stability. Stable solutions where
either men or women possess an average energy of O(1) are not possible.
V. DYNAMICS BETWEEN STABLE STATES
Rotations play a central role in the algorithm which finds all stable states. As for the
GS, this algorithm has a man–oriented version and its woman–oriented counterpart. As
mentioned a rotation is a cyclic permutation of partners within a subset of persons in a
stable matching M, which allows to reach a new stable matching M′. In the man–oriented
algorithm, to which we shall restrict attention, the execution of a rotation raises the energy of
any man involved, and lowers the energy of the corresponding woman. In this way, starting
from the man–optimal state, the execution of rotations, in all possible orders 2, allows
to reach sequentially all other stable states until the woman optimal one. This process,
therefore, runs through the set of stable states shown in Fig. 1 from top (the man–optimal
2A rotation, like the one in eq. (2), can be executed on a stable state only if it is exposed, i.e.
only if each man µi is paired, in that state, with the woman ωi specified in eq. (2), for i = 1, . . . , r.
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state) to bottom (the woman–optimal state).
We can understand this process with a generalization of the GS dynamics. Imagine that
in a stable state M = {(mi, wi)}, a woman ω1, for some reason divorces. This event leaves
an unpaired man µ1, and the GS dynamics starts again: µ1 will run through his list making
proposals to the women following ω1 until he finds a new woman ω2 which prefers him to
her partner µ2. This will put man µ2 in the same situation as man µ1 before. The process
will continue, involving other men µi and women ωi, until a man µr will make a proposal to
woman ω1. Under the GS dynamics, this proposal will be accepted, because ω1 is free. It
might happen that the new partner of ω1 is better than the one she left f(ω1, µr) < f(ω1, µ1).
In this case the state thus reached will again be stable. The dynamical process described
above, exactly represents in this case, the execution of the rotation (2).
On the other hand, if, for woman ω1, µr is a worse partner than µ1, the state will be
unstable. Indeed (µ1, ω1) constitute in this case a blocking pair: both of them would indeed
prefer to get together again than to be married with ω2 and µr respectively. We can, in
this case, regard the above process as a “virtual” process that does not lead to a new stable
state and that leaves the state unchanged.
Note that the probability that the next proposal ω1 receives is better than the one she
holds in the stable state is f(ω1, µ1)/N ≃ ǫF/N . ǫF ∼
√
N implies that the probability
that any woman improves her situation with a divorce is very small O(1/
√
N). With such
a small probability divorce is very risky for any woman under the strategies fixed by the
GS algorithm (Note, on the other hand, that there will be O(
√
N) women ω1 for which the
above process leads to a new stable state).
This dynamics motivates a deeper study of the statistics of rotation lengths. Indeed we
can understand the execution of a rotation as the response of the system to the small pertur-
bation which causes the first divorce. While the response is generally linear in equilibrium
statistical systems, we shall see that a small perturbation on a stable marriage can cause a
large response, i.e. a large change in the system. This is reminiscent of the behavior of self
organized critical systems. The statistics of rotation lengths is also interesting to understand
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the “geometrical” nature of the organization of stable states. Indeed the rotation length r
measures the “distance” between two stable states, i.e. the number of marriages which differ
in the two matchings.
We found that the normalized distribution of the length r of a rotation satisfies
P (r,N) =
1
r0(N)
ρ
[
r
r0(N)
]
(7)
with the typical rotation size scaling with N as r0(N) ∼
√
N .
The scaled distributions are shown in Fig. 3. All data collapse on a single curve which
is remarkably well fit by a Gaussian ρ(x) ≃
√
pi
2
exp(−x2) (line). This scaling behavior can
be understood considering the above mentioned extension of the GS algorithm. Note indeed
that the number of men involved in the process is r. Using arguments similar to the ones
leading to eq. (5), one sees that each man typically needs an additional N/ǫF proposals.
So the total number of proposals received by ω1 is r/ǫF . The length r of the rotation is
obtained imposing that ω1 receives ∼ 1 proposition. This implies that r will be typically
of the order of ǫF ∼
√
N . It also implies that the men’s energy difference between the two
states is dǫH ≃ r/ǫF , which is of order one. This agrees, apart from logarithmic corrections,
with the observation [5] that there are ∼ N logN stable matchings.
VI. GLOBALLY OPTIMAL SOLUTION
While there exist powerful numerical algorithms to obtain all stable matchings in a
systematic way it is a much harder problem to find the ground state, i.e. the matching with
minimal total energy. For an analytical approach it is convenient to introduce the random
variable
x(m,w) =
1
N
[h(m,w) + f(w,m)] (8)
which is the normalized energy associated with the formation of the pair (m,w). Since we
are no longer interested in stability considerations it is not necessary to distinguish between
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the energy of men and women. In the large N limit x(m,w) can be treated as a continuous
random variable with distribution ρ(x) = min(x, 2 − x) for 0 < x < 2. The problem of
finding the minimum of
ǫ(M) =
N∑
i=1
x(mi, wi) (9)
over all matchings M reduces to the bipartite matching problem which has been solved by
Me´zard and Parisi [7] using the replica technique for the disorder average. Following their
approach we obtain
ǫmin = 1.617
√
N. (10)
On the other hand, minimization of ǫ(M) = ǫF (M) + ǫH(M) subject to the stability
condition, i.e. to eq. (5), yields
ǫstablemin = 2
√
N. (11)
Thus giving up the constraint of stability allows for a reduction of energy by 19 percent.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the classical stable marriage problem which despite its simple
definition contains the full complexity of highly frustrated systems like spin glasses. In
contrast to the traditional examples of statistical mechanics where the dynamics of the
system is governed by a single global quantity, the Hamiltonian, the stable marriage problem
fits more naturally into the framework of game theory where the concept of Nash equilibrium
plays the central role. The game-theoretical definition of stability leads to the somewhat
paradox result that although all individuals do whatever they can in order to maximize
their personal benefit the resulting stable states are not the globally best solution. In the
large N limit, we found stable states with total energies ranging from ǫstablemax = N/ logN to
ǫstablemin = 2
√
N , whereas the globally best solution has ǫmin = 1.617
√
N . Within a stable
matching the distribution of individual energies, say for the men, is decaying exponentially
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where the decay constant is determined by the mean energy of the women, and vice versa. As
a consequence, the mean energies of women and men satisfy the simple relation ǫH ǫF = N .
We also studied the distribution of distances between stable matchings in an instance of size
N . This distribution turned out to be a universal function when the distances are scaled
with the typical rotation length r0 ∼
√
N . Introducing a simple dynamics, this result also
implies that the system is characterized by a non–linear response to perturbation similar to
the one observed in self organized critical systems.
There are still many open questions to be investigated in this problem. It would be
interesting to compare the distribution of individual energies in the ground state, i.e. the
globally best solution, with the one we found in stable matchings. The latter, as shown, are
well described by independent variables with a common distribution. On the other hand
one expects that, in the ground state, they are much more strongly (anti-) correlated and
that individual energies can fluctuate much more wildly (see e.g. [8]).
Another interesting question is how many blocking pairs there are in the ground state
since this would be a measure for its degree of instability. A very rough argument suggests
that this number is of order ǫ2min/4 ∼ N .
We are also presently investigating a generalization of the model where the assumption
that the preference lists of different individuals are uncorrelated is replaced by a more
realistic hypothesis.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Average energy of men (ǫH) and women (ǫF ) for all stable matchings in systems of size
N = 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000 (from left to right) on a double logarithmic scale. The analytic result
of Eq. (5) is indicated by lines. The ✸ point below each line corresponds to the Ground State
energy.
FIG. 2. Distribution of individual energies of men (open circles) and women (full circles) for
all stable matchings in an instance of size N = 1000 on a logarithmic scale. The energies of men
(women) are scaled by the their average values: x = h(mi, wi)/ǫH for men, and x = f(wi,mi)/ǫF .
The solid line is the analytic result of Eq. (4).
FIG. 3. Scaled distribution of rotation lengths for systems of size N = 100, 200, 500, 1000. The
curve is ∝ exp(−x2/2).
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